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INTRODUCTION
"A tenure is simply a bundle of rights,. . , rights to use land, 
trees and their products in certain ways and sometimes to exclude 
others" Bruce and Fortmann (1988:2)? It can also be appropriately 
added to this definition that a system of tenure rules is both 
determined by the production process it seeks to regulate and 
also has a definitive bearing on that process of 
production.Moreover, a system of tenure rules can be imposed on 
a mode of production to suit "external" interests rather than 
those of the people engaged in it. This, it is contended here, 
is precisely what has historically happened to the "communal" 
system of land tenure in Zimbabwe's "communal" areas (C.As).
f
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tit .ted, in an ideological and political 
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- colonial Zimbabwe (Ranger:1585,1988: 
in the paucity of empirical research into 
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.The extarj; in land tenure and rural development discourse assumes 
th at the "communal" lend tenure system prevailing in Zimbabwe's 
C.As is a static i.r; — tution and that those people whose 
livelihood is based or. a production process governed by this 
tenure system are not constantly redefining their rights, duties 
obligations ar.d strategies with respect to the land, its 
resources and to each other.lt is further assumed that what 
differentiation exists among the "peasantry" is so minimal as to 
be insignificant rc the process of production. (vide e.g. 
Moyana:1934). These static "models" ignore the changes that are 
constantly occurring in the production process in response to 
changes in the political and economic environment, technological 
advances, demographic dynamics etc. all of which impact both the 
production process ar.c. the tenure system which regulates it.
dJhe dynamic nature of any mode of production makes it difficult 
to envisage a static system of rights in the most fundamental 
force of .production - land. Land tenure is, ergo, a dynamic 
institution in a constant state of flux and, ergo, people's 
strategies, actions and goals in an agrarian system of production 
regarding the resources governed by a particular set of tenure 
rules are also in a constant state of flux.
o
In this paper, I argue chat che system cf tenure obtaining in 
Zimbabwe's^. As is little understood. Not much empirical research 
has been undertaken to challenge the prevailing notions about 
tenure svstem alceit evidence exisls to suggest that some 
elements of a" svstem of rights corresponding to freehold and 
private individualised tenure occur in this "communal"tenure 
system. Mv view is that changes are constantly occurring in the 
tenure rules Governing the system and hence people's rights and 
obligations regarding catacn property resources (CPRs) are in a 
concomitant state of" fit;:. Hence the policy solutions for the 
sustainable utilization oi c-^r's necessarily has to be based on 
a recognition and understanding of the historical nature of the 
changes that are taking place in the tenure system, incorporate 
those asoects of locally evolved strategies and actions that have 
a positive impact: or. CPRs generally, and have a dynamic 
orientation based on the recognition that the policy solutions 
will themselves comprise the basis for a new sequence of 
mutations in the tenure system.
"Communal" Land Tenure: Tar.-rue a Definition of the Existing 
tenure System in she C...U-
There is considerable debate in the literature pertaining to a 
precise definition of "communal" land tenure. The absence of 
common ground among 'end tenure analysts, sociologists, 
anthroooiogises _nd . oriar.s alike bears testimony to the
complexities of this se. are system and hence points to the 
pertinent need for policy to be informed by specifications of the 
distinguishing r am cures"cf the tenure system in question.It is 
essential, in the search for policy solutions to the problems of 
resource degradation • in tKe C.As, to consider and define the 
tenure system coarating ir> alie.se areas as it is ultimately this 
system that defines the * nature of the relationships that come 
into existence among people regarding their utilization of CPRs 
and thus circumscribes the micro-politics of CPR utilization and 
management. The orevailing tenure rules, since they would also 
fiave definitive ramifications for the success of policy solutions 
on CPR management, would also need to be incorporated into those 
solutions.
tyA "tenure" is simply a bundle of rights to use the land and its 
products, by a clearly defined individual or group of 
individuals,"possibly to the exclusion of others. "Conventional" 
tenure systems include "leasehold", "freehold" and "communal" or 
"traditional" tenure. Tenure systems are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, and sometimes do co-exist within the same production 
system. As Bruce and Fortmann (1989:2) assert, "...it is not at 
all unusual for a village to have a certain tenure over a piece 
of land, while an individual or family has tenure over part of 
the same land, and the scate asserts a residual title in the same 
land."
The structure of agricultural production in Zimbabwe is
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characterised by the existence cf four distinct types of land 
tenure and farming systems. Large seal- commercial farming areas 
(formerly European Areas) occupy 35% of the land and comprise 
extensive holdings under an individual freehold system, with an 
average holding size of 3 000 hectares. Small ^cele commercial 
farming areas (formerly African Purchase Areas), account for 4% 
of total land area and contain 110 COO smallholders on farms of 
80 to 200 hectares also under a freehold system. Resettlement 
areas, 'introduced in 1980 to reallocate land formerly in the 
large scale commercial sector, also occupy 41 of the land. The 
government holds title to this land and extends annually 
renewable permits to settlers. The -sue of tenure in the 
resettlement areas is still to be resolved. The "communal" areas 
cover 42% of the land and cater for about 55% of the population 
on individual arable holdings of between 2 and 4 hectares. 
However, vast differences in land holding sine are beginning to 
emerge in the C.As in i a process cf accumulation and 
differentiation (vide e.g. .Jackson r-t ■ 1 1S87; Amin and Chipika 
1990)."Key resources" such as grazing, forests and forest 
products, water etc are communally held.-
I am, in this paper, concerned only with the "cc 
system and the implications that this system cf 
current form, has on the management and utilize 
property resources in the C.As and thus I turr 
section, to a definition of the "communal" system 
obtaining in these C.As.
mmunai" tenure 
tenure, in its 
tion cf common 
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Bruce (1986) asserts that:
"Communal tenure has been used tc cover as least three quite 
different situations. First, it may refer to a common 
ownership which implies common exploitation and management. 
Indigenous land tenure in Africa :1c commu'ial in this sense 
only in exceptional cases.. . . Second, the term may refer 
to the right of members cf a group to each use independently 
the full extent of certain land of the group, a right of 
commons. This is often the case with ere. 7. ing land or areas 
for hunting and collection of firewood, but is not the
situation as regards arable lard._w  r ■ cce conditions of
shifting cultivation. Third, the term may refer to 
significant group control, reflecting some group interest 
over land apportioned for the relative exclusive use of the 
group. The group may be an extended family, a lineage, a 
clan, a village or a tribe. It is usually defined by common 
descent, common residence or some combination of these two 
principles . The croup's Interest m?v be f~.---rred as a property 
right or couched in political ~m cKllmlnlrtva'-ive terms. (mv 
emphasis).
For Bruce, it is only in the lest s. m.. chat indigenous tenure 
in farmland is communal .Now, the queetzen v. a mu me ask is whether 
Bruce's typology is typical of the tenure system in the C.As of 
Zimbabwe.
(/For_ Parsons (1971:16); "A system cf land tenure rules defines 
both the opportunity to earn income from agriculture and the 
security of that opportunity. The tenure rules define the rights 
and duties of people to each other, with respect to the land". 
Tenure systems are by definition dynamic. Changes in land tenure 
systems can be brought about by economic changes such as the 
introduction of cash crops, ir.crea.ses in population density, 
urbanization, increased demand for food, investments in land such 
as the Introduction of tree crops etc.
Recent historical work (Cheater 1989,1990; Ranger 1985,1988) 
suggests that the current "official" definition of the "communal" 
land tenure system in Zimbabwe is both a political and 
ideological conceptualization designed to suit the interests of 
the ruling classes. Cheater (1989:1) maintains that due to the 
centrality of land to the politics of both colonial and post 
colonial Zimbabwe:
"[It] is not surprising that land tenure, more 
especially the racial division of land, was ideologized 
by both land-grabbing colonizers and those whose 
struggle against colonization was ultimately 
successful. Given this ideologisaticn of land, it is 
unsurprising that there has" bean little detailed 
investigation into landholding practices, especially 
in the so-called "communal'' or "tribal" areas'"
For Ranger (1988:3):
"The idea . . . and to some a>;ti ... 
"traditional communal tenure" grew a 
power vacuum during early colon izlis;
power ovc~ land and no-or.-_: 1 r _j-r •
colonial authorities were content t 
peasant production to itself; the-./ 
land as people spread out from ch 
villages; and people essot" v- ] ly _ 
themselves bv moving into 7 during 
of peasant resettlement of the count;.--, 
in these new peasant communities, 2.r 
basically local and consensual.
;ha practice - of
n a sort c .r rura
X . v,;11- r 1 . b- Vnd losi TH r  •"
:o leave Oiu._rgcn
no sb~ Tos.a3 0
3 old centralised1 '• C'j P1 ■ n .1 •: r r) to
the rreat process
/side. m>. r. -v-. •: -C 0 r-A. -  » '-- U. J— C. 1* j
of. a Ilocation was
1 e -■ ■?- until the
interventions of the coloni/l 192n onwards1
(my emphasis).
The manner of both these arguments is to disprove the existence 
in Zimbabwe of a "communal" tenure system corresponding to any 
of Bruce's situations of communal tenure. That a communal system 
of tenure involving group control b v m  i m d  did in fact exist in 
pre-colonial times is beyond doubt. * owever, the advent of 
colonialism also saw the demise of such, a rand tenure system as 
colonial capital sought to gain control ever land and institute 
a system of agricultural' production whose success depended on 
the supremacy of settler production and the creation of labour 
reserves in the newly created "Tribal Trust Lands" (vide e.g. 
Arrighi 1970). It is also beyond doubt that the control of arable
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land was individual in the pre colonial land tenure system, with 
significant group control being exercised only in CPRs.
While it is not Ranger's purpose to deal with the historical 
trajectory of the tenure system in question, and as such he pays 
only peripheral attention to the fate of the "communal" land 
tenure system after the interventions of the colonial state in 
the 1920s, a great deal of the material he collected is of 
relevance to the deductions subsequently made about the evolution 
of the "communal" system of tenure in colonial Zimbabwe. On the 
other hand, Cheater, who specifically sets out to investigate the 
land holding practices in the "communal" areas, comes to the 
conclusion that the idea of communal tenure is a normative and 
ideological concept that does not correspond to the de facto land 
holding practices among the Zimbabwean peasantry. The state and 
its people thus have different constructs of land tenure and the 
land tenure system. Herein lie the origins of the problems of CPR 
management, as shall be demonstrated in a later section.
I turn now to a brief discussion of the historical development 
of the "communal" system of land tenure in Zimbabwe and attempt 
to demonstrate how the "official" normative constructions of 
landholding on the one hand and the de facto landholding 
pfactices on the other have historically affected natural 
resource use and conservation and the implications of this 
dynamic for agrarian reform and sustainable CPR utilization and: 
management in the C.As.
The Historical Trajectory of "communal" Land Tenure in Zimbabwe
Ranger (1985) sets out to demonstrate that the Zimbabwean 
peasantry consciously adopted the "peasant option" in apparent 
preference to labour migration into the colonial wage labour 
system. Throughout the colonial period, legislation was 
promulgated which was aimed at creating a conducive climate for 
the operation of colonial capital by driving the peasants off 
the land into the wage labour system, thereby achieving the dual 
objective of protecting settler agriculture at the same time as 
a large reserve army of labour ""was created for the nascent 
industry (vide Arright 1970). The present dual and inequitable 
land distribution bears testimony tc '.his process.
The peasants resisted the efforts of the colonial state to 
undermine their production system through a variety of strategies 
ranging from increasing their output by bringing more land under 
production in response to increased taxes, to subverting settler 
agriculture by grazing their stock cn "European" land. It was in 
this context that the colonial construct of a "communal" land 
tenure system came into existence.
The colonial model of communal tenure, to which some nationalist 
historians and analysts subscribe (sue Cheater 1989), and which 
has been carried over into independence virtually intact, 
maintained that the distinguishing" attributes if this tenure
c
system as it operated in the newiv crated Reserves were:
1. Land rights are vested in a corporate group which 
has overriding rights over those of the individual.
The land is held in trust by some representative of 
the group (usually the chief, the headman or lineage 
head) who is ?ilso responsible for allocating land to 
individuals within that group for specific uses.
2. Land rights are inalienable and to that extent land 
is only a use-value. As Movana (1934:13) states: "No 
member of a group could sell or transfer land to an 
outsider as land was considered a natural endowment in 
the same category as rain, sunlight and the air we 
breathe".
3. Wpmen do not, in their own right, have rights to 
land. Primary usufruct rights go to married men and 
women only have secondary rights of usufruct either by 
virtue of their marriage or their membership of the 
patrilineage.
4. Since land is only a use-value, and therefore has 
' no exchange value, there is no market in land.
I
This model of communal tenure is based on the assumptions that:
1. Communal tenure operates in a system of shifting cultivation 
and, by implication, land abundance. However, there is a dearth 
gf evidence which — suggest the existence of a'" system 5f
sM^tungcultivation in Zimbabwe immediately before the advent 
of colonialism. As Wilson and Sccones (1939:33) point out "[At] 
least in southern Shona areas, the dominant farming system in; 
the 19th century was not shifting cultivation at all; rather it 
was a system of intensive continuous farming cf ylei areas". 
Moreover, legislated colonial expropriation and cenbra^Tisation, 
resulting as it did in the increasing concentration of people in 
progressively smaller and fragile ecosystems, as well as the 
vesting of allocative powers in st_ece agents, have had the 
cumulative effect of obliterating the last vestiges of shifting 
cultivation, at least in all areas outside of the Zambesi valley.
In the Zambezi valley shifting cultivation continues to be 
practised, albeit on a very limited scale. There is evidence to 
suggest that shifting cultivation among she Tonga of the Zambezi 
valley is a direct result of the construction of Lake Kariba 
which resulted in their relocation from the fertile alluvial 
plain of the river valley where the Tonga had engaged in very 
successful tillage of the river valley, to the dry and tsetse 
fly infested higher ground where, because cf their relatively 
unsophisticated tools and methods, the difficulties of 
accumulating capital and investing in agricultural production 
distance from the markets and colonial neglect, the Tonaa have 
been forced into shifting cultivation.
2. A second and equally erroneous tenet of the colonial model is 
that "communal” land tenure is oriented towards subsistence 
production. Numerous examples can be adduced to show that even 
in pre-colonial times the production of an agricultural surplus, 
and hence a market orientation, already existed. Studies have 
demonstrated that extensive agricultural trade existed in grain 
and tobacco in pre-colonial Zimbabwe. Capital accumulation, 
primarily in the form of cattle, was an important feature of the 
commoditization of.iron tools in the pre-colcnial era. Cheater 
(1989) points to the existence of the term hurudza in chiShona 
(meaning one who produces an agricultural surplus) as further 
evidence of the early market orientation.
Arising out of this assumption of a subsistence orientation is 
the further assumption that, therefore, peasant society is 
relatively undifferentiated. Ranger (1935) demonstrates that the 
emergence of a plough owning rural eneropreneurial class during 
early colonialism only exacerbated existing differentiation among 
the peasantry, it did not signify its beginnings. Thus rural 
differentiation is not necessarily a product cf colonial capital, 
it pre-dates it.
3. Thirdly, it is assumed that since land is inalienable by 
virtue of its being a use-value only, the acquisition of usufruct 
rights is based on allocations made to the individual by some 
representative of the group.
Ranger's (1985) work suggests the seif allocation and individual 
selection of fertile land in proximity to transport routes rather 
than allocation by the group.
Arguing against the "mythology of chiefly allocation of... land" 
Wilson and Scoones (1989:82-3) cite two problems with this model, 
namely that: "...even the existence of defined chiefly and ward 
territories does not actually date from the pre-colcnial 
era,...it seems likely that chiefly control over land allocation 
evolved during the colonial era ac a substitute for direct 
political power". And, secondly, the model ’’...does not explain 
the actual patterns of land access even during the colonial era. 
What actually existed was an on-going struggle to control land 
access between different categories of chiefs, commoner lineages, 
individual farmers and the state".
Several other studies have also noted different types of 
transactions in rights of usufruct, including cash payments, 
starting during the colonial era. Ecurdiilon (1952) states that
"... even when the old ideas about land are not 
completely forgotten . . means have been found according' 
to which land can be bought and sold: initially the 
original user could demand compensation for the work of 
clearing and preparing farmland- but as land becomes 
more scarce, value for the land itself is added to the
compensation fee, and chiefs a.. headmen can charge
settlers a fee for the aliocacicn of land. Now, in
crowded areas, people expect to pay even for the 
allocation of a residential plot - as much as $70 near 
Salisbury".
Other studies have identified a variety of payments for rights 
to "communal" land ranging from compensation payments 
etc. (Holleman 1969); cash payments for permanent improvements to 
the land - such as houses, orchards, wells etc. - as well as for 
the land itself by both the colonial and post colonial 
governments to people moved under resettlement, construction, 
irrigation and other programmes (Cheater 1989; Scudder 1966), to 
suggestions by the representatives of the peasant communities - 
both pre and post-colonial - of collective willingness to 
purchase land in order to secure permanent title to it (Cheater 
1989:9; Ranger 1985:337).
The involvement of the state in these transactions in allegedly 
inalienable "communal" land imputes some legality to this fact. 
In fact, legislation does exist to roguiaue transactions in 
communal land. The Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) of 1951 was 
in part aimed at instituting some' form of individual ownership 
of communal land. Under this Act, numerous rights to both arable 
and grazing land were allocated to in■; ivlduais.Transactions in 
these rights were allowed and did occur, "as Holloman (1959") 
notes; by 1963 over 700 arable right:, and gracing- rights for 19 
600 livestock had been sold to new individual owners, (adapted
from Cheater 1939:11). Cheater ? 3 9 :1C ) c.Iso sL. a wib 12 hat
"...under the 1967 Tribal Trust I. . v-d ■anc 1965 V -*tnq rpenure Lx C l. 0 j
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taken into account in discourses bout the lai"d in the present,
even though all subsequent legisla 2L i. h;.s cent inu ed t0 recognisa
the individualised, heritable r: h t o C1? 7i -7,£ d ur.der the NLHA"
(1989:11). Other observers have cci'7.1 ■'ted on the trli j cr G "Cory or
the land tenure system as influe ICO by color. • — n h-CiX .LGgtslatxuon.
Scoones and Wilson (1989:S4), or - r obs orve that:
"[However]. ...the actual pattern JJ of own-.- re hiP ad acces 3 have
once more developed into a varian x.U of patriIff . - ~i control
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The foregoing section points to the contradiction that exists 
between the "normative" definition of "communal" land tenure and 
the de facto land holding practices in the C.As. It is my 
contention that these contradictions point to the need for new 
approaches to land tenure analysis that take as their point of 
departure incisive studies into the dynamics of rhe tenure system 
prevailing in the C.As and suggest .policy solutions that take 
cognisance.. of the strategies.„.Iairea:.y being adopted by the 
peasantry to deal with the incentives-and. ...dis-incentives of their 
system of production. There should be a shift from policy 
solutions to the "problems of communal land tenure" that are 
instructed by normative notions of what should be happening in 
that tenure system as opposed to what actually is happening. I 
shall address this issue later in the context ci sustainable C?R 
utilization in the C.As.
The point to be made here though is that it is quite clear that 
the relations of production in the C.As are changing. These 
changes have also led to tenure changes in the direction of more 
individualised access, not only to arable land (which is 
individually controlled in most communal tenure systems anyway), 
but also to include hitherto communally owned resources. What 
then, is the precise nature of these tenure changes and what 
implications do they have for the political economy of she CAs 
generally and on CPR management in particular?
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Since independence in I960, a number ci stuaie: 
to describe the changes that are occurrin in
contexts of access to credit: faciiit: 
markets (Truscott 1983; Bratton 1981;
(Adams 1987); investment of. r s a i i a m A  
agricultural production (Weiner and Harris 
1987; Spiegal 1981); access to riabXa 
(Amin and Chipika 1950; Cousins 198 7 ; it 
economy of hunger (Shopo 1S85). These studies generally irxdieate 
that a process of differentiation is taking place in the communal 
areas and that the current high levels^ or proauction car. be 
attributed to only the top 20% of rural ^nousenolds (the rich 
peasantry), who produce in excess of OCT or total C.As 
agricultural output. These rich peasants nave access to off-farm 
income, cattle, implements and have more lar.a than the poor 
peasants. Differentiation and access to err -ana income 
poses a problematic for the definition of
Cousins 1990 for a fuller discussion). This process or 
differentiation obviously has profound implications for agrarian 
reform in Zimbabwe after the expiration of the Lancaster
a i
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constitution, and for the productivi 
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the^  myth of homogeneity therein, they do not constitute an 
analytical framework by which the nature of the changes occurring 
in the C.As can be conceptualised and policy solutions for the 
"problems of communal tenure" conceived. They do, 
however,constitute the basis upon which broad generalizations 
about the nature of the process of production and the mutating 
relations of production in the C.As can be made and the static 
"communal" tenure model questioned.The need for such an 
analytical framework is thus obvious.
I turn now, in the next section, to an historical assessment and 
discussion of the political^ economy of resource degradation in 
the "communal" areas.
The Political Economy of Common Property Resource Degradation in 
the "Communal" Areas: An Historical Assessment.
That the "communal" system of land tenure has been indicted for 
resource degradation in the so called "communal" areas of 
Zimbabwe is in fact an artifact of the inability cr unwillingness 
of successive administrations, both colonial and post - colonial> 
to take cognisance of3 the internal dynamics of the tenure system 
and its evolving and sometimes antagonistic articulation into the 
rest of the economy.
In considering the question of resource degradation in the C.As, 
it is imperative to first distinguish the resources in question 
and specify the tenure regime(s) governing the utilization of 
these resources. Only then can one conclude with any certainty 
that degradation of that resource is or is not a tenure problem, 
and thus prescribe appropriate solutions, i-ly concern here is with 
common property resources, i.e. resources access to which is 
predicated on membership of a group and utilization of which (and 
hence exclusion from access) is collectively governed by the 
group. The foregoing sections have demonstrated that arable land 
is decidedly not part of the CPR regime.
In this connection then, the crucial question to ask is whether 
or not there is a contradiction in a tenure system in which 
arable land is not part of the CFR regime to the extent that 
individual, even if not strictly private - though increasingly 
corresponding to it somewhat - tenure of land is recognised, and 
communal tenure regimes govern access to all other resources 
which are vitally important to the operation of the whole 
production process of the C.As.
My contention is that there is a contradiction but that this 
contradiction is not typical of Hardin's "tragedy of the commons" 
which results from the irrational exploitation of CPRs because 
the benefits of resultant degradation are greater than the costs. 
Rather, the contradiction arises precisely out of the failure by 
the state to take full cognisance of the internal dynamics of the 
tenure system, particularly as regards the regulation of CPRs. 
This has led to the institution of legal and administrative
11
constraints to the development of appropriate CPR management 
institutions at the local level, which in turn has resulted in 
the relatively unregulated utilization of CPRs and inevitably 
culminated in degradation. The misinterpretation of the basic 
causes of resource degradation has led to the prescription of 
inappropriate solutions in the past.
To develop this line of argument, it is necessary to first 
outline* the nature of CPR degradation as it has historically 
occurred and the policy reactions to the phenomenon. From this, 
alternative analyses of the problems will emerge and perhaps a 
process of searching for alternative and radical policy solutions 
will begin. Since my own analysis is not based on any 
considerable amount of fieldwork, it should be considered only 
as the basis for discussing the need for new and relevant policy 
directions, rather than as constituting a basis for such policy 
directions.
Of the "communal" land under cultivation,a large proportion is 
in areas that are either unsuitable :or cultivation at all orj 
for the crops being cultivated. Only for of "communal" land is 
suitable for intensive cultivation. Persistent overgrazing,! 
especially by domestic; livestock, in combination with "incorrect! 
land husbandry practices", have allegedly impoverished extensive 
areas of the C.As. The same processes are said to ba solelv 
responsible for heavy stock and' wildlife losses, particularly in 
dry years.
Land in the C.As is extensively used for grazing domestic stock, 
particularly cattle. Capital accumulation primarily takes the 
form of cattle, albeit significant investments are also made in 
other forms of constant capital such as ox-drawn
implements,fencing, tractors etc. Capital accumulation is an 
important dimension of rural differantiaticn. A large proportion 
of the communal rangelands is now se.-erely downgraded, a 
situation which has also led to serious soil loss and to the 
siltation of rivers and dams. This is a very recent phenomenon, 
dating back to the creation of Reserves and the concentration of 
people on marginal land.
The degradation of rangelarids is primarily a consequence of the. 
expansion of arable agriculture into areas previously designated 
grazing land. This arable expansion was the inevitable
consequence of the adoption of the "peasant option" and the 
colonial attempts to degrade the viability of this option. As 
Ranger (1985:36) observes with reference to Makoni Reserve; 
"Taxes were increased and grain prices fell; there were 
droughts and famines as well as good years - but the 
response of the . . .peasants to every eventuality was 
always the same. They increased the cultivated area. By 
the end of the 1920s this process had almost reached 
its limit and it was reported that 'the number of 
cattle in the reserves is becoming too large as so much 
of the land is under cultivation'. ..peasants responded 
to the depression year of 1930 by yet further
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extensions of their land [into designated grazing 
'areas]."
It was only in the 1930s that the colonial government started 
paying any attention to the conservation problems of the 
Reserves. This represented a shift from a prior preoccupation 
with white farming as a source of soil erosion etc. The colonial 
government's perception of the soil erosion problem in the 
Reserves was that it resulted from the use of the plough and the 
opening up of new land by the nascent class of "plough-owning 
entrepreneurs". The policy solution was "centralization" which 
was applied to oust this new entrepreneurial class and to 
eventually drive them out of the Reserves system altogether. As 
Ranger (1985:72) has pointed out:
"Originally designed as a conservation measure pure 
and simple, by which a division was made between 
exclusively arable and exclusively grazing land, 
'centralization' became a means of redistribution of 
lands in the Reserves... the reason advanced [for 
centralization by the Assistant Agriculturalist in 
1938] was the activity of the plough-owning maize 
growers" Ranger (1985:721).
f
However, the peasants had a quite different perception of the 
problem, one based on their experiences of the colonial land 
policy and their reactions to it. This led to a crisis in which 
the peasants would not implement the conservation measures of 
the colonial state and continued to use grazincr land for arable 
purposes.
"Indeed, much of the tension between black peasants 
and white administrators in the . 30s and IS-lbs arose 
from their quite different pcrcc;_ons of the nature 
of the crisis in African Agriculture. Peasants saw it 
as a crisis brought about by low prices, government 
intervention in marketing, the increasing diversion of 
labour into conservation works etc. Government saw the 
crisis in terms of bad African methods threatening a 
collapse of the productivitv of the so’i" Ranger 
(1985:36).
Government attempts to undermine large rural er.treoreneurs 
continued with the promulgation of the Native Land Husbandry Act 
in 1951. This Act is often regarded as having introduced the 
potential for capital accumulation in the Reserves bv providing,', 
for individual tenure. However, its implementation had the effect 
of yet another equalization of landholdings (vide Rancer 1385). 
Needless to say, the conservation measures of the" ~NLHA were 
resisted by the peasantry for the same reasons as the
"centralization" programme, notably that "provision for
conservation works, for fallowing and for limiting livestock 
numbers meant taking out of production land that "was already*"not 
enough to guarantee even subsistence needs..." cliffe (1986:52).
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After the end of the second World War, colonial agriculture in 
Zimbabwe' became profitable for the first time in history. This 
necessitated the implementation of Land Tenure Act (LTA) and lad 
to mass evictions of African "squatters” from "European" land 
unless they entered into labour agreements with the white 
farmers. Again preference was for the "peasant option". The 
result was a dramatic increase in the human and livestock 
population of the Reserves and a concomitant and inevitable rise 
in the rate and extent of resource degradation in the Reserves. 
To illustrate this point, consider the following example from 
Ranger's study of the Tanda Reserve:
"It had been estimated (by the Land 
of Tanda was arable land, 75% grazi 
land; it had thus been recommended 
families be resettled in this Res 
implementation of the LTA; "[Irh
Inspectorate)
zg I
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Ranger (1985:147).
output dropo.:
rains washed away the 
ulav, silt and humus. 
E to 5 bags par acre1
conservation works - 
, rotational grazingThe NLHA, with its provisions for intensive drain strips, gulley dams, contour ridge* 
etc. - was introduced against this background. The peasants 
bitterly resented these measures which tney saw ( m a  cua.re 
correctly too) as a waste of labour in 
did nothing to increase the productivity c 
resented having to give up the insura: 
by wet gardens.
conservation wor 
the
agains
ks which 
oil. They also 
famine offered
Thus resource 
>•?
:ipaliydegradation in the C - ^ , principa l  tie 
degradation of grazing land due to arable expansion, ^ ut 
by extension, the degradation of forests (since c7eaf'uiF J-pret'lr‘J 
for arable production is the single meet impor~an_ xactor in
deforestation) and hence of wildlife by Ln£ 
habitat, J were the inevitable re. 
distribution of land and the colonia 
of the problem as being essentially
destruction of
or
:ra'
.e inequitable 
:ive perception 
m d  their
failure to prescribe appropriate 
redistribution. In the light of
outline, it becomes evident that 
ergo, a socio-economic, oolitica'
drainisi
t8nure prooiem,
+■ i rvr. a i . e . lanQ
h ;• q vQg a m g  crier tis ^ ori^dj. 
p7 £cNidation in the C.As is, 
and. °;-Q£ess r a t h e r
solutions, 
b ;
than an artifact of the 'commune' r ’ ] AVAL
rr> ■ ru-Lb i - c- —*■ -■a 1 -.r-1 anArable expansion into grazing has post-colonial Zimbabwe. The res 
managed to settle only 40 000 households 
000 by 1934, has obviously not signii
otin. or 
.cantly
;s t unabated in 
gramma, having 
a targeted 162 
relieved land
pressure in the CAs especially when one considers that employment 
in the hon-agricultural sector has not increased at all while the 
population has grown at an annual rate of around 2,9%. A more 
extensive discussion of the resettlement programme is not the 
objective of this paper, and has already been presented in other 
work (vide e.g. Moyo 1990).
Proposing an economic cost and benefit analysis for aiable 
expansion into grazing, Scoones and Wilson (1989) observe that 
such expansion has tended to be more rapid in the overpopulated 
high potential areas in natural regions 11 and 111, and in the 
areas of spontaneous resettlement in the north (the Zambezi 
Valley). In these areas, returns on opening up of arable land 
will probably remain higher than the costs of reduced grazing. 
Scoones and Wilson also observe that enclosure of common grazing 
land is occurring on a mostly small scale around homesteads and 
sometimes around areas of old abandoned fields. "Enclosure of 
grazing adjacent to or around homesteads and fields will increase 
the trend towards the creation of integrated 'small-holdings' 
along the lines of highland Kenya".
Scoones and Wilson cite four principal ways in which the 
"invasion of the commons" is occurring:
1. The incorporation of lands adjacent tc existing holdings, 
drainage and path lines in a continuation of :■ -ciro (an ideology 
of individual freedom to counter colonial technocratic control, 
that came into existence during the liberation war). "This 
expansion is mainly done by resource rich farmers, for whom 
arable land is a severe production constraint".
2. The opening up of new fields in the grazing area, usually by 
young men who cannot wait for their iru.c..:stance of land or whose 
existing inheritances are too small, sometimes with the local 
authority's (sa.bhuku. chief, VIDCO chairman, councillor etc) 
illegal authority.
3. Direct "squatting" by outsiders on grazing land with some local 
permission for which illegal payments are sometimes made. "There 
may often be resentment by local people, but again it seems that 
the right to survive - even at common cost or cost to another 
community - is powerfully recognised".
4. A feature of sandy soil areas under population pressure is 
expansion into grazing land through homefields around the 
homestead. "Such homefields tend to be more productive than most 
'outfields,'[because they enable the application of fertility 
inputs without transport problems and the benefits of homest. . d 
litter may also be considerable] and it is noticeable that most 
of the really productive farmers have managed to obtain 
homefields...Attempts to destroy homefields use, or to villagise 
people, will therefore have a negative effect on productivity" 
Scoones and Wilson (1989:85-7).
The enclosure of CPRs is significant to note here. It points to
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the .development in the "communal" tenure dynamic of a definite 
trend towards individualised tenure of all the resources 
essential to the production process. It is also significant to 
note that this trend is occurring only in the higher potential 
areas, this has obvious implications for land reform, as shall 
be demonstrated in a later section.
The post colonial government has basically inherited the colonial 
ideology and most of the legislation for "communal" land tenure. 
Consequently, resource degradation in the C.As continues to be 
blamed on the tenure system (vide e.g. Chavunduka Commission, 
Chitsike Commission). These Commissions' policy solutions, 
together with the National Conservation Strategy from which most 
current natural resource management programmes draw their 
inspiration, emanate from apolitical and ahistorical analyses of 
the resource problems of the C.As. Consequently,the de facto 
system of land tenure in the so called communal areas is not 
defined, the dynamics of this system are not even questioned and 
' the colonial ideology is accepted. Rather, these programmes 
simply seek to blame the problems of resource management and 
degradation in the C.As on the communal tenure system. This 
approach is decidedly superficial, and hence the policy solutions 
thus prescribed are often inadequate or inappropriate, and 
resource degradation continues almost unabated in the C.As.
I One such programme that shall be dealt with in this context is the Communal Areas Management Programme For Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). Martin (1984:iv) writes in his summary of the programme that:
"The CAMPFIRE programme has been designed to address the 
problem of communally owned r.etural resources . . . .Communal 
ownership is an entirely appropriate system where resources 
are plentiful. ... However, the stage has been reached in 
the communal areas of Zimbabwe where changes are rapidly 
becoming manifest and nature 1 resource^ are declining 
because of a failure to evolve new systems of land 
tenure...." (my emphasis).
| This clearly is an indictment of the "communal" land tenure 
system. That such a system exists is taken for granted, and it 
is not clear where the evolution of new systems of land tenure 
should originates. The assumption is also made here that land 
tenure implies a similar system of tenure regarding other land 
resources. As has been demonstrated in preceding sections, this 
is not necessarily the case. Moreover, resource degradation is 
not a tenure problem, but rather a socio-economic, political and 
ecological problem that is firmly rooted in colonial land^- 
distribution.J
The misj5£nc.qption of the "resource problem" has a long history 
in southern Africa. Beinart (1984) maintains that:
i "... there is a strong conservationist tradition in 
\ southern Africa that is anything but progressive. It
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This, of course, is not to say there is no resource degradation, 
problem per se in the communal areas; there is. It however points 
to the fundamental cause of the problem, land distribution, so 
that all efforts to solve this resource degradation problem 
necessarily have to be predicated on a radical solution tp the 
land problem if they are to succeed in the ieng term. Thus 
without land redistribution, spontaneous settlement in the 
marginal Zambezi valley ecosystem will continue until the C.As 
there can absorb no more settlers, by then the wildlife and 
forestry resources will have been degraded to a stage where 
sustainable utilisation will be well .nigh impossible, and 
settlement will definitely turn to the National Parks and 
Forestry areas within this area. The CAM?FIRS programme is not 
even remotely likely to stop this encroachment in the absence of 
land reform.^
That the peasants have always had a radically different 
perception of the reality of their situation than the normative 
"official" perception of successive administrations is also 
demonstrated by the various strategies they adopted of subverting 
state ownership and control of natural resources. The 
expropriation of land consisted of the substitution of state for 
local ownership of hitherto communal resources. Tnus land in the 
Reserves became state land, held in trust for the state by some 
representative of the tribe (the chief, who was also a state 
agent) through the Tribal Trust Land Act. Similarly, the King's 
Game Act, The Natural— Resources Act, she Forestry, Act and the 
National Parks ard ..Wildlife Act, have all in succession been 
aimed at instituting state control of rhe natural resources of 
the communal areas. The peasant reaction to state ownership has 
always been subversion. $
Subyersion' initially took the form of breaking down fences to 
graze livestock on private freehold and state land in response 
to the dis-incentives - destocking/ overcrowding,etc. - to stock 
raising in the Reserves. This form of subversion also includes 
the illegal exploitation of other natural resources such as 
hunting and trapping of animals, cutting down trees and fishing 
and has continued into post-independence tines. The CAMPFIRE 
programme is in part aimed at resolving some of these problems 
by involving local communities in the management of suate owned 
resources such as wildlife and forestry. /
Subversion of state ownership took a more striking form after 
independence when the collapse of the colonial state was 
perceived by the peasants to signify the disintegration of all 
colonial land and natural resources legislation as well. Thus 
there was a dramatic increase in the incidence of 'spontaneous 
settlement/ on both state land and the former white commercial 
farmland. The new government was slow to react re this strategy, 
essentially because of their own obligation to land 
redistribution, which had been a major contention cf the 
liberation struggle. However, after the start of the resettlement 
programme, 'spontaneous settlement1 was branded 'squatting' and 
the state moved in to evict these 'squatters’ from all illegal 
settlements. However, the sluggish pace at which the resettlement 
programme has progressed, the fact t'nai rest of the resettlement 
has occurred in natural regions iai and iv, as well as the 
failure to provide security of tenure equal to that obtaining in 
the C.As, has meant a preference for /oneancons settlement to 
resettlement.
Cheater (1989) observes that: "The state has used the 
resettlement programme to acquire land, from the freehold sector 
and to cancel title to it, presumably achieving two different 
ideological goals simultaneously: state ownership of the means 
of production, and decommoditisation of land in line with the 
'communal' landholding model....The clear preference has been to 
lay claim on vacant, non-state land, rather than to be 
resettled." Bratton (1986:191) adds that "[A]Ithough many 
proficient farmers want more land, they also want firmer property 
guarantees than the government is willing to provide."
In my view, this form of subversion, 'spontaneous settlement' or 
'squatting', as well as peasant reluctance to be resettled, 
represent a continuance of the preference for the 'peasant 
option'. The 'peasants' are determined to maintain their property 
rights in land and natural resources in the face of state 
intervention that is targeted co erode any such rights. Given 
also that the ideological perception of 'communal'tenure has 
remained basically unchanged, Government intervention has also 
basically continued to attempt to superimpose a 'communal' model 
that does not necessarily correspond to the de facto landholding 
practices and production strategics of the 'communal' areas.
The "communal" land tenure system has thus proven 
•and has changed to accommodate changes in
to be flexible 
the economic
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environment'. Individual rights in land have begun to take 
precedence over group rights in land, with the result that the 
tenure system itself can no longer be seen as simply "communal" 
in the sense of group rights in land.
Having thus traced the historical origins of rescurce degradation 
in the C.As to the establishment of the colonial state and the 
imposition of colonial ideology on peasant rationality, I turn 
now to the question of the burrent status of CPRs in the C.As 
with a view to identifying a possible analytical framework for 
policy solutions to CPR management problems. In the foregoing 
sections, I focused my attention on the political causes of the 
degradation of both arable land and CPRs. In this section, I 
intend to also focus on wildlife and forestry in the C.As on the 
one hand and grazing on the other as I believe that these 
constitute somewhat different CPR regimes as a result of their 
different modes of articulation into the colonial state, and also 
because current attempts to address some of the perceived 
resource problems of the C.As have focused mainly on these 
resources.
The Implications of 1 Communal‘ Tenure for Sustainable Common 
Property Resource Management: The reed For Radical Agrarian 
Reform.
"For agricultural workers, little gardens and potato plots; 
for the town workers sanitary improvements and the like - 
such is their programme. It is an excellent sign that the 
bourgeoisie are already obliged to sacrifice their own 
classical economic theory. partly from political 
considerations but partly because they themselves owing to 
the practical consequences of this theory, have begun to 
doubt it. The same" thing is proved by the growth of 
professorial Socialism [Kathedersozialismus] which in one 
form or another is more and more supplanting political 
economy. The actual contradictions engendered by the mode 
of production have become so glaring that no theory can 
conceal them any longer, unless in were this professorial 
socialist mishmash, which, however, is no longer a theory 
but drivel.
.... Their socialism is municipal socialism; not the nation
but the municipality is to become the owner of the means of 
production". K.Marx and F.Engels: On Britain (pp519 and 532)
Shopo (1984:16) notes that there is a need to redefine the sense 
of community beyond petty projects of municipal socialism to the 
level of structural transformation at the highest level of the 
state to bring about more effective participation in development 
by the people.
"Such an agenda would not be premised or. attempting to solve 
the crisis of world capitalist accumulation... but would 
revolve around the principle that development is for the
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people. The most important index of accountability will 
therefore be popular participation. In operational terms, 
popular participation means pro^dural ana structural 
mechanisms to enhance the managerial and productive 
capacities of rural workers and peasants and to create 
opportunities to devise and develop a .11 e r r a t i v e income 
generating activities.to provide an j nst itutj onalised 
process of giving the rural poor a better chance in reaping 
the benefits of development programmes, and to provide a 
process and method for pepp1- to bargain with development 
agencies .1
In announcing the decentralization of the Local Government system 
in Zimbabwe, the [then] Prime Minister announced that the 
intention was. to bring about:
-t
"a comprehensive and more effective system of involving the 
local communities both horizontally and vertically in the 
process of planning and effecting their development, thus 
enabling Government to assess tlm development needs and 
priorities not only of the provinces but also of the 
district, ward and village areas within the province" 
' Provincial Governorship of Zimbabwe (1964).
Thus the participation of the rural population in development 
should not be limited to the people sharing in the distribution 
of the benefits of development, it requires that they also share 
in the task of creating these benefits. //
How then, are local rural Lcommunities to be involved in the 
development of their own areas? Does such involvement have any 
implications for sustainable CPR management in particular and 
land reform generally? Two programmes have so far been instituted 
in the C.As whose success is predicated on the participation of 
communities in the management of CPRs - The Grazing schemes and 
CAMPFIRE programmes. Focus in this paper will be on the CAMPFIRE 
programme as the grazing schemes are sufficiently dealt with in 
Cousins (1990)
Before addressing the issue of CPR management and implications 
for land reform, it is imperative that the distinguishing 
features of the CPR regime in question, i.e. the property 
relations existing between people who are co-users of a specific 
CPR, be specified. This, of course, requires an in-depth analysis 
of property relations which is not the purpose of this paper. For 
a fuller discussion see e.g. Cousins (1990). Nonetheless a brief 
outline of the relations governing access to grazing, wildlife 
and forestry will be undertaken here.
Property is an enforceable right of a person/s to some use or 
benefit of some thing (i.e. a political relationship between 
persons). It is not that thing to which the right refers. For 
MacPherson (1983:1): "The meaning of property is not constant. 
The actual institution, and the way people see it, change over
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time....The changes are related to changes in the purposes which 
society or the dominant classes in society expect the institution 
to serve." Thus since property is a man-made institution, it is 
made and maintained/changed to serve some specific purpose, so 
that people's perceptions of that purpose define for them the 
nature of the property institution. Property then, is a dynamic 
institution.
MacPherson distinguishes three types of property - common 
property, private property and state property.
:"Common property is created by the guarantee to each 
individual that he will not be excluded from the use or 
benefit of something; private property is created by the 
guarantee that an individual, can exclude others from the 
use or benefit of something.^Both hinds of property, being 
guarantees toi individual parsons, are individual rights. 
..State property ... consists of rights which the state has 
not only created but has kept for itself or has taken over 
from private individuals or corporations. ... State 
property..., is a corporate right to exclude. As a corporate 
right to exclude others it fits the definition of corporate 
private property ."/< 1SS3 : 3 ) .
In Marx's view, property as an insrituti 
class relations of production-and refers 
means of production. Property relations 
the mode of production which creates to 
production is characterised by its own 
(different modes of production, from die- 
can coexist but the dominant mode of P- 
relations of production of that epoch)•
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.am. since every mode of 
relations of production 
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What then, is the property institut i-'n regarding the "common 
property resources" of the C.As? I--- consider V7ildlife,
forestry and grazing in turn.
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forest land in the Reserves remained ,C-L ~iV3 conmon property
regime by creating chiefly and w7ard (onnhu) territories to 
regulate access. State ownership was assumed over wildlife in 
the Reserves, on private freehold lar.s c.r.a on state land and
c:n nanea that grazing and
forest resources outside the Resej and private freehold land.
Wholesale utilization of wildlife fob commercial 
from European hunters and adventurers °p_p**e 
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played by the hunters and adventure-'-; Paving 
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purposes came 
who shot wild 
unprecedented 
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the way for 
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early 1900s that colonial governments started assuming control 
over wildlife and wildlife resources through the promulgation of 
legislation designed to regulate wildlife utilization. Based on 
a conservation and preservation rational, the assumption of state 
control consisted of the delineation of game reserves and 
expropriating all private rights to wildlife, both within and 
without the game reserves. It was in this way that wildlife in 
"British Africa" became the 'King's Game' (Graham 1973). This 
trend has continued and state ownership is still the basis of 
wildlife utilization in Zimbabwe. Wildlife utilization on private 
property (freehold area), 'communal' land and state land is 
regulated by the National Parks and Wildlife Management Act of 
1975. Under this Act, the state is the sole proprietor of all 
wildlife and wildlife products on all land in Zimbabwe. Thus 
wildlife in the C .As is not part of the CPR regime, it is stateP_rgp_erty. /
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Illegal utilization of wildlife and degradation of the resource 
inevitably resulted from the assumption of state control which 
effectively precluded the emergence of local regulation of 
utilization. The encroachment of grazing and arable agriculture 
on wildlife areas is also probable- going to start occurring as 
a result of the same phenomenon,Vas well as of the need for 
agricultural land in response to pressure in the C.As. o'
The CAMPFIRE programme, as has beer., seen above, is designed to 
solve the "problems of communal.'! v r/.-neo resource?". To date, The 
main thrust of CAMPFIRE has bean in the direction of involving 
local communities in the management of the wildlife resources of 
their areas in the face of increasing poaching, the department 
of National Parks and Wildlife Manage. _..t's increasing inability 
to monitor and police utilization ir. the C.As, and the increasing 
threat of encroachment of the National Parks as land shortages in 
the C.As become more acute. This objective (c 
property under a CPR regime) is to be achieved 
of 'Appropriate Authority' to manag 
Councils in the C.As terms of the HI. —  - 
programme, those District Councils with appropriate authority are 
empowered to make decisions regarding the utilization of revenues 
earned from the exploitation of wildlife in their constituencies. 
On leasehold land, the landholder is empowered to utilise the 
wildlife on that land in accordance with the provisions of the 
same Act. Wildlife, however, remain.
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Taylor (1937), writing on some of the pet 
implementation of CAMPFIRE, states that:
Menu for the
"For most local inhabitants, ownership of a wildlife 
resource, or indeed other natural" resources, is 
conceptually difficult to perceive, it is a resource 
which has always been part of the environment, to be 
exploited when needed or else viewed as a problem..."
It would seem here that Taylor is ignoring* the effect 
of state ownership of wildlife on the perceptions of 
that property institution by the 1 local* inhabitants', 
and the local forms of utilization of that same 
resource (e.g. poaching), which are probably a 
consciously adopted strategy to subvert state ownership 
of a previously common property resource. The very 
existence of a property regime means that people's 
rights and obligations regarding that thing to which 
the right pertains are defined, and she pecde involved 
become subject to the resultant property relations, and 
that, therefore, their concept of the thing is a 
function of these property relations. In MacPherson's 
words (1983:1): "Kcw people- see the thin.?
foropertvl . . . that is. what concent have of it...
is both cause and effect of what ft is_at any time."
(my emphasis).
Bromley and Cernea (19S8) note the in. _ of the dissolution of 
local - level CPR management institutic n through the imposition 
of state ownership in resource degrader _or..
"Resource degradation in develop: 
incorrectly attributed to ' co.auor. 
actually originates L in cha di 
institutional arrangements whose ver 
rise to resource use patterns that 
dissolution of local institutional a 
a combination of powerful rulers at 
village, colonial administration, ar.d 
state. National governments have not 
resource management regimes . ' (my em.j
.r.g courti— -i m rrU* O j whi
property resources
ssolution cf ioc
y purpose was to give 
were sustainable. The 
rrancements arose from 
come remove from the 
the rise of the nation 
rsplcced these former
DIacIS juS )
Bromley and Cernea are advocating a return to common property 
regimes based on the utility of such regimes in sustainable 
resource management and the failure of state management. The 
CAMPFIRE programme also suggests the creation of a common 
property regime for the sustainable management of natural 
resources in the C.A's. It points to the need to "provide the 
appropriate institutions under which resources can be 
legitimately managed and exploited by the res.id^nt communities 
for their own benefit" and to "introduce a new sysaem of croup 
ownership and territorial rights to natural rpc;nn,rces for the 
communities resident in the target erene". Martin (1986). This 
is the course that the implementation of the programme is taking, 
though the creation of viable local management" institutions is 
likely to be realised only in the long term, giver, the long 
history of state ownership. But how is this conclusion reached in 
the CAMPFIRE programme given that it calces as its point of 
departure the inability of 'communal' tenure to sustainably
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manage natural resources? Perhaps this apparent gap points 
further to the need for a comprehensive conceptual framework 
within which solutions for resource management problems should be 
sought.
i
That local resource management institutions atrophy as a rbsult 
of the assumption of state control over the resources, resulting 
in unregulated utilization and resource degradation is also 
demonstrated by Lawry (1989) . Ke makes the observation that state 
control results in local institutions losing their legal rights 
to control local resource use at the same time as the state - 
because of logistical limitations of staff and funding - is 
unable to put effective management systems in place. The 
emergence of local solutions to future resource management 
problems is also effectively forestalled in the orocess. "...the 
state's principal objective in centralising control [is] to 
assert its political authority over local "interests, not to 
impose new resource management regimes. States have concentrated 
their regulatory efforts on indivld-.x:. oxers, -><->•i- on local user 
groups." Lawry (1989:5; my emphasis).
It thus emerges that the solution :or resource problems in the 
communal areas lies in the development of £r[ institutional 
framework by which defined user groups can regulate resource 
utilization and exclude non-users from the benefits of their 
common resources. As Lawry (1938:13) states; "the "devolution of 
greater management control to local user-grouos is a broadly 
desirable policy goal". Such a strategy however has some 
fundamental implications for 
addressed urgently.
Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop ( 
property resource management 
of constituted bodies or set 
historically always existed 
resource conservation. Such 
central to solutions of today
Scoones and Wilson (1983:108) 
increasing common property rc 
grazing management, is the iss
land refor;m r p ,will need to be
1972: 1 d i J) pc i t 4“ t V' *■ common
institut;_ 0 - -.0 v e j. v.her in the fcrms or rules nd -r^o:aulations ) haveand RJ-CiVOia be a oficial roles ininsti■j - 'J I-' OI- r* also oromise to be1 s p r _• ‘ * J r;-source px'cbiem. «a> .
note tlxde one cf the oroblems in-sources m anagemenic, in thi3 Casesue of nd r.s gives.
"Prior to instituting grazing regimes the issue of exclusive 
land rights has to be dealt with. Existing land rights 
involve a diffuse pattern of overlapping rights, including 
those of land spirits, chiefs, ward heads,"village heads, 
local patrilineage heads and individual homesteads. Rights 
at any level never fully exclude rights at another level."
Research has demonstrated that the existence of this diffuse 
system of land rights has precluded the emergence of any strong 
land management units, at least in the nineteenth century, (vide 
Scoones and Wilson 1989; Mukamuri 1987) contrary to Holloman's 
(1951) assertion that "wards (matunhu) were the"basic units of 
land management among the Shona. . ." Wards are constantly changing
\
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due to a dynamic process of boundary renecoti 
and Wilson (1989) warn that the fact that they 
rural people, especially among chiefly " 
administrative units of land, is not necessari 
are resource management units.
.ation and Scoones 
are considered by 
l_neages, to be 
iy proof that they
The development of CPR institutions is related +-n arr d-^ermined 
by the patterns of resource use. Scoones Ap'd wllsol' (1989) 
demonstrate that resource use in the C.As tends to be confined 
to areas around people’s villages, rather than to be extended 
ward wide. Because of the local interests in neighbourhood 
resources, an overlap in interest in the wider community context 
is inevitable. This explains why no groups core cenerallv in a 
position to claim exclusive tenure of~ c?Rs ana hence the 
preclusion of the emergence of strong resource management units.
Attention has ^however tended to focus m 
of grazing institutions. The fact that 
century were no longer predominantly 
involved in sedentary agro - pastoral! 
institutions did in fact exist during t 
had atrophied as a result of the chs 
system.
cstly on the development 
: the shona by the 19th 
P^storalist but rather 
-m could mean that such 
he pasroralist tir^s but 
hngas in the prce^ccion
The pastoralist Ndebele developed a system of trancehumance 
(lagisa), in response to grazing shortage in the reserves. This 
institution still exists to regulate the use of rangeland among 
the Ndebele. (For more detailed discussion of lac is a see e.a. 
Prescott 1961; Scoones and Wilson 1981).
In the context of the contemporary crisis in grazing management 
in the C.As, Cousins (1987) observes that: ’’Grazing schemes have 
been widely promoted ...as a means or addressing a perceived 
resource conservation problem. .. These schemes are designed as 
common property regimes” However, Cousins notes that grazing 
schemes are confounded by all sorts of conflicts, particularly 
in their attempts to exclude potential users.
Thus while the need for some institutional arrangement to manage 
CPRs in the C.As is clear, this would necessarily be predicated 
on the need to develop systems of land rights Lhas would be 
conducive to the development of such institutions. It follows 
that the extent to which a "community" can establish an 
enforceable degree of exclusivity in resource use is an important 
consideration. This would entail creating new property regimes 
and specifying the rights of users in each regime to the 
exclusion of other potential users.
Lawry (1989:18) points out come important considerations in 
instituting local CPR management:
1. Common property management schemes muss incorporate clear 
incentives for individual participation. The distribution of 
common property benefits in relation to individual labour 
and other contributions must be clear from the beginning.
25
2. Communities will welcome devolution of authority, 
particularly where it gives them preferential rights in 
relation to others.
3. The most effective management systems will emerge out of 
collaborative arrangements, where the state provides 
technical assistance and assists in the enforcement of rules 
agreed to by a credible local institution.
The decentralisation of local government in 1984 provides us with 
a viable starting point in the search for viable C?R management 
institutions. Decentralization resulted in the creation of VIDCOs 
and WADCOs in each District area,each with clearly defined 
geographic and demographic boundaries. The Communal Land Act 1982 
vests ail land authority in the C.As with the District Council 
which in turn has delegated rhe authority to allocate land to the 
VIDCOs and WADCOs. The extent to which these lower tier 
institutions have been able to dispense this function is an open 
question since they have found themselves in the throes of a 
mighty conflict with other existing institutions at that level 
who want to assert uheir own authority over land - the chiefs, 
sabhukn.etc.- especially regarding allocation. (vide Murombedzi 
(1987) for detailed discussion or. the development of VIDCOs and 
WADCOs).
These lower tier institutions do not have any legal status. It 
is imperative that they should be legally empowered into land 
and resource management institutions if they are to be the basis
:or icca. norm. cave roomer. Moreover, as currently
VIDCOs andrV>« WADCOs are not resource utilization mits, r.eitner do they correspond in any way to resource use 
patterns in their areas (which often cut across ward and village 
boundaries and are part of the reason for the constant boundary 
renegotiation). Nonetheless VIDCOs and WADCOs have the potential 
to cut across the diffuse and overlapping land rights systems to 
create unitary regulatory units.
What is envisaged is a system where the VIDCO is the 
ho.'
: y c ^ — i a v t c u i i i c -LC i_. .c x o l i . c ^ i d S l C  l a n d
olding unit with regulatory functions over the definition,
ries, with.on and access to all CPRs within its bounds
the WADCO functioning regutate CPRs access to which
would be ward wide, or at least would not be exclusive to a 
single VIDCO, depending on geographic and ecological attributes 
of the resource in question. Such a system would need to develop 
out of a process of local consultation to delineate boundaries 
and determine access.
However, the exclusion of potential users is problematic. The 
enclosure of grazing is already occurring in regions ii and iii 
in which the poorer households are losing access to CPRs. Given 
also the nature and extent of differentiation in the C.As. some 
decision must be made regarding users and non-users.The case for 
land reform having to consider the natural region in which it is 
located is made by Ushewokunze (1990).It should also be added
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here that land reform in the communal areas must be instructed 
by the strategies and choices that have been adopted by the 
peasants in each C.A.
Moreover, a decision has to be made about the objectives of any 
agrarian reform programme, 'between the economic objective of 
increasing output and the pursuit of social justice by ensuring 
equitable access to communal land. It would seem though, that 
land reform after 1990 will take the form of accelerated 
resettlement to achieve the goal of social justice. As stated in 
the ZANU (PF) election Manifesto for the 1990 General Elections:
"The Party and Government will soon be introducing the Land 
Acquisition Bill in Parliament which will give Government 
more power to acquire more land for reset clement wherever 
and whenever it is acquired. The President and First 
Secretary,..., has made it abundantly clear that land must 
be given t-o those who till it and need it for food 
production. He will not brook any interference or criticism 
in pursuing the coal of equitable distribution of the land."
Thus land will be acquired from the large scale freehold sector 
and redistributed to relieve pressure on the communal lands. 
There is a definite limit to the amount of redistribution that 
can satisfy land hunger and it goes without saying that what is 
also needed is the accelerated generation of non-agricultural 
employment to reduce the agricultural oooulation. (see Moyo 
1990). v
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